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To summarize the long and complex papers presented and the lively
discussion to which they gave rise is a task beyond my capacity; and
may not provide a useful substitute for a careful study of the full record.
My choice is rather to reflect on the broad issues that are central to most
of the papers and much of the discussion. These issues relate to sig-
nificant and meaningful measurement of economic performance and
change—excluding here the measurement of social performance, as dis-
tinct from economic. Measuring social performance raises many addi-
tional, and somewhat different, problems. Except for Dan Usher's in-
teresting treatment of the economic value of the long-term gain in life
and health, a gain too wide to be comprised under economic, all papers
dwelt on measuring economic performance—and even so perhaps too
narrowly: little attention was paid to distributive aspects of economic
performance, and to questions of international comparability of economic
aggregates and of their significant components—a point to be touched
upon below.
The various issues, many of them covered in the Juster paper, but
discussed also, separately and with more emphasis and detailed analysis,
in most of the other papers, stem from the difficulties of attaining a
measure of net output of the economy that would reflect properly the
full range of returns and costs—both viewed not merely as monetary
receipts and outlays in a defined institutional setting, but as positive and
negative entries with respect to what may be regarded as final goals of,
and constraints on, economic activity. For the present purpose, we may
agree that the final goals are provision of goods to ultimate consumers,
the living members of society, and net additions to capital stock relevant
to ultimate consumption, current and future; and that the major basic
constraints are the limited time and knowledge at the disposal of the
current generation, with responsibility to both the current and the future580 ConcludingRemarks
generations. It is with reference to these goals and constraints that the
problems in the measurement of net product arise, reflecting the limita-
tions of the current measures. These limitations should not be viewed as
a matter of intellectual willfulness, but as results of deeply rooted meas-
urement problems, and of the difficulty of agreement on underlying con-
cepts and on assumed analytical relations.
If we start with the measurement of "pure" consumption, implicit in
the definition of final goals of economic activity, the major issues relating
to presently included components can be listed as follows:(i) The
separation of outlays, within the present totals of household purchases
of commodities and services, that are the results of changed conditions
of production and are required for the changed role of the consumer as
producer, distinguishing them from those that are in response to needs
not governed by the requirements of production. The illustration that
easily comes to mind are the larger consumer expenditures in dense
urban communities, the latter called for by the increasing scale of
modern production, for satisfying the same level of wants that were
so much more cheaply satisfied in the countryside.(ii) Another im-
portant category is the outlays on education, and possibly on other
items relevant to raising the quality of individuals as workers, which
suggests that there is a component of investment, in addition to pure
consumption. (iii) When collective final consumption is examined, as
now represented by government current outlays on goods, there is the
possibility that much of the flow is a "regrettable necessity" and does
not add directly to the flow of goods into consumption by the living
members of society; nor does it add to the relevant stock of capital.
These three sets of questions about the character of several important
components now included under "final" consumption may be supple-
mented by a fourth (iv), relating to the difficulty of measuring the net
output of some activities, whose product is clearly relevant either to
final consumption or to net capital formation, but the market mechanism
for which yields inadequate gauges of their appropriate value. This
difficulty arises either because the activities may refer to public goods,
or because the goods may have quality aspects which the market is not
in a position to evaluate properly (or perhaps no one is now able to
evaluate, say many educational services). The reference to these four
questions in the papers and in the discussion is widespread, and the
papers by Olson and Rivlin are particularly to be noted.
While the present estimates of final household and collective consump-
tion may be viewed as including sizable components that are either off-1
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setsto production-induced costs, or intermediate products, being costs
of running the machinery of society and the state, or investment in human
capital, there are also omissions of components that are properly part
of a pure consumption total. This refers not only to (i) tangible products
of household activity which, for many comparative purposes, should be
included, even though there is no orientation to the market or easily
available market counterparts; and possibly (ii) returns on household
capital (besides housing), with consequent modification of the treatment
of purchases of durable consumer goods. There is, also, the major topic
of (iii) greater leisure and other intangible benefits of the lesser demand
that work and economic activity make upon the time and limited capaci-
ties of human beings—a topic conspicuously raised in the Nordhaus-
Tobin paper and the discussion that followed. There is finally (iv) the
problem of measuring negative correlates of both production and final
consumption in the way of current injection of ill-elements into conditions
of life—whether they be pollution of the air, congestion, and the like.
These are to be distinguished from increases in negative capital stock,
just as we distinguish positive returns from capital from the relevant
positive capital stock.
The list of problems, or questions of inclusion and omission, for the
second component of net product—net capital formation—is different
from that just suggested with respect to household and collective con-
sumption. In particular, the questions of inclusion of nonrelevant com-
ponents are far more limited, while those of omission are many and
weighty. This tilt of the problems when we deal with net capital forma-
tion, as compared with consumption, issignificant:itsuggests that,
limited as the scope of net product in conventional accounting is, with
emphasis on market-oriented activities for which proper weights can be
secured, the tendency has been to define consumption widely, including
a number of components whose inclusion is of doubtful legitimacy; and
net capital formation too narrowly, limiting it to reproducible material
capital. As will be suggested below, this reflected a theory of production
and of economic growth in which the requirements for output and growth
were far too narrowly defined.
To be sure, even net reproducible capital formation may include
components (i) which, in their strict relevance to "regrettable necessities"
and in their nontransferability to serve the ends of pure consumption,
should not be viewed as adding to real net product (no matter how
well they may reflect the capacity of society to produce more of real
goods if the resources can be turned to alternative uses. The point is that582 ConcludingRemarks
they cannot be so turned so long as regrettable necessities persist, and
the reference to "necessities" is not accidental). But it is the omissions
that are far more important. To begin with, there are (ii) stocks of con-
sumer durable goods within the household (other than housing), the
changes in which, on an alternative treatment of this component, would
be recorded—to be combined with current returns from use, as part of
current consumption. Then there 'are (iii) stocks of intangible capital
representing the investment in education and other means of raising the
quality of human beings as economic producers, these recorded for the
given level of current useful knowledge that such education transmits.
Of most interest, and indeed of importance dominating any concern
with education as capital investment, are (iv) the intangible stock of
knowledge, of material technology, and related processes and (v) the
stock of social knowledge and institutions employed in translating the
existing stock of technological and other useful knowledge into greater
output and productivity. Considering that accretions to the stock of
knowledge were the major dynamic element in modern economic growth
in the developed countries, and that the succession of social inventions
and institutional changes shaped the major channels for transforming
the potential of growing knowledge into the reality of growth of output
and productivity, it is frustrating to note that little effort or progress has
been made toward measuring, or devising some reasonable gauge for,
the changing volume of the stock of knowledge. Such approximations
would have permitted us to observe the changing difference between
movements in the stock of knowledge and those in output and in ma-
terial reproducible capital formation. The same comments apply to the
stock of social inventions and institutions—an even more complex prob-
lem of measurement. It is hardly a surprise that the relations between
'net capital formation, narrowly defined, and changes in output have been
found so puzzlingly variable over time and different in space.
There is finally (vi) the exclusion of changes in the stock of natural,
"irreproducible resources"—in quotes because both resources and re-
producibility are functions of the existing state of knowledge and tech-
nology; and will change as the latter change. Indeed, it is this dependence
that may explain the omission from national accounts of depletion of
even observable natural resources. If the depletion were to be counted,
so would additions to resources produced by new discovery and knowl-
edge—and the latter measured not by the small inputs of labor and
capital into the process but by the much bigger addition to capacity.
Given the difficulties of estimating resource-significance of new tech-
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nologicalknowledge and the omission of the latter in measuring net capi-
tal formation, it would have been illogical and misleading to deduct de-
pletion of existing known resources. The same reasoning applies to
depletion by pollution, etc. Since the original contribution of natural
resources, and particularly of improvements in their use (of air, water,
etc.), when represented by new technology, had not been included in the
estimate of changes in stock, it is illogical and biased to enter a minus
sign for pollution or deterioration. This does not preclude the value of
undertaking a separate analysis of stocks and changes in stocks of natural
resources, under conditions of a given technology—dealing with a range
of problems raised in the Herfindahl-Kneese and Leontief papers—but
they should not be included in net balances for estimating net capital
formation. The point is simply that the propriety of doing the latter, i.e.,
including negative changes, is contingent upon including the positive
changes in the stock of useful knowledge relating to material or social
technology, which presently is not being done and probably cannot be
done in the near future.
2. EFFECTS OF CONCERN WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH
The list of problems above may have omitted some of the issues raised
in the papers and the discussion; or, what is more likely, may not have
stated them in the form that seems most appropriate and revealing to the
participants. But my hope is that, with some qualifications, the list formu-
lates adequately the major issues that dominated most of the papers and
much of the discussion.
The list suggests two reflections. The first is that the problems are
numerous, and recalcitrant; and would require a variety of sustained
experimental and imaginative research before acceptable answers and
measures are established. Second, in their character and recalcitrance,
these are all questions of long standing in the national income literature,
belonging to the problems of inclusion or drawing the dividing line be-
tween economic and noneconomic, on the one hand, and productive and
unproductive, on the other; of netness and grossness—of distinguishing
between costs and returns, between intermediate and final products; and
of valuation, i.e., of a meaningful weighting system by which to combine
the diverse costs and net economic products into acceptable and articu-
lated totals. These are the groups of questions that have occupied the
Income and Wealth conference from its very start, some thirty-six years
ago. And in somewhat different form and language, these questions were
the foci of repeated discussions in the economic literature going back584 Concluding Remarks
now some two centuries, or longer. While I cannot document this state-
ment by an adequate exercise in bibliography and history of doctrines, a
reference to the long controversy about productive and unproductive
services in the classical and Marxian schools (still affecting the national
income accounting in the communist countries today) should remind us
that the distinction between final and intermediate products, and that
between economic transaction and economic production, were at issue
then. In general, the problems under the three heads above are perennial,
because they deal, essentially, with the separation between economic
activity and life in general, and with theories of production and valuation
which, however elaborated, would tend to lag behind rapidly changing
reality and the rapidly shifting focus of observation of economic research;
and thus always be present, if in changing variants.
If these be old questions, although in somewhat new guise, one may
ask why the sudden rise in interest in them—a recent trend, of which
this conference is only one illustration. The answer seems to me to lie in
the effects of recent concern with, and an accelerated study of, economic
growth, combined with some recent products of such growth—all of
which raise questions about its quality as distinct from quantity—or bet-
ter, questions about its real or true quantity as distinct from that yielded
by conventional measures.
Thus, the quantitative study of economic growth, in which the con-
ventional measures of gross and net product and its components, that are
now subjected to various criticisms, were used to gauge the rate and
reflect the structure of growth and the relations of growing output to the
inputs, revealed the productivity gap. This was an unexplained residual,
left after allowance for inputs of labor and capital, on the definitions of
these inputs that were implicit in the conceptual framework of national
product accounts. The gap suggested that either the production factors
implied in the conventional national product framework were incom-
pletely formulated; or that the relations between input and output were
incorrectly perceived—and, in either case, more had to be learned about
the characteristics of the factors or about the determinants of the shape
of the relations between input and output. The singling out of quality of
labor, reflective of differences in education and perhaps of other invest-
ments in quality of human beings as producers, was a clear response to
this explanatory gap. While we may be uneasy about the emphasis placed
on this source of quality differences in labor, and particularly bothered
by the difficulty of establishing the specific component of outlays on edu-
cation, etc., that represents investment rather than consumption, itisI
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clearly the emphasis on economic growth that resulted in the emergence
of this concern with investment in human capital—and of a host of
issues that would lead to fairly far-reaching modification of the current
economic accounts if they were to be consistently followed through.
Likewise, the demonstration that the high rate of modern economic
growth is necessarily accompanied by a high rate of shift among produc-
tion sectors, in the scale of productive enterprise, and in conditions of
life required by active participation in the production process, leads to
emphasis on changes in conditions of the life of individuals, as both ulti-
mate consumers and workers, that were required by the changes in the
production system. This called attention to the components in the chang-
ing structure of household expenditures that were clearly imposed by the
changing conditions of work, in addition to education and other invest-
ment in human capital; and raised questions about these components as
regrettable necessities, this time within the household rather than within
the government collective.
Furthermore, the increasing complexity of economic structure result-
ing from economic growth, the large monopolistic scale of some of the
production units, and the necessity of controlling the continuous, incipient
conflicts generated by structural shifts in the course of modern economic
growth called for a greatly augmented governmental apparatus—for eco-
nomic regulation, for responding to pressures for greater equality of eco-
nomic opportunity, and later for greater economic equality, and finally
for assuring the international position of an economic society organized
under a sovereign state in an age of intensified nationalism. The rele-
vance of the resulting government output to the final goals of economic
activity was brought sharply into question by the great rise not merely
in the absolute, but in the proportional, magnitudes of resources devoted
to government consumption in the rapidly growing developed countries.
Finally, pollution, depletion, and other negative by-products of eco-
nomic production were greatly accelerated because of the very rapid rise
of total output, in the conventional measurement—the growth of both
output and pollution reflecting the rapid rise in the technological power
of the modern production system, particularly with rising population.
Economic pTOduCtiOn, and the technology that it employs, may be viewed
as interference with the natural course of events, in order to shape the
outcome to provide economic goods to man. All such interference has
potential negative ecological consequences—pollution and the like—the
more lasting, the higher the level of production technology as measured
by its capacity to produce goods. After all, wooden products decay and'Ti
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plastic and rustless steel do not; and the economic advantage of salvaging
the latter, once discarded, is, in many cases, absent. Likewise, the pollu-
tion potential of a modern power or chemical plant far exceeds anything
observed with the more traditional technology of the ox and bullock. If
one adds that modern economic growth feeds on a succession of tech-
nological innovations, the eventual consequences of the mass spread of
which, positive and negative, cannot easily be forecast, then the inevita-
bility of unexpected, unforestalled, negative consequences of economic
growth is practically assured.
To put the arguments above simply, the concern with, and the process
of rapid learning about, modern economic growth revealed that the pro-
duction theory implicit in conventional national product measurement,
based on simple relations between labor viewed as a kind of homogeneous
substance and reproducible material capital, on the one hand, and output
on the other, was too bare—overlooking many of the additional require-
ments of production, a variety of sources of productivity other than ma-
terial reproducible capital, and the high probability that, in addition to
positive output, increased production yielded also negative output, in the
way of pollution, congestion, and the like. It suggested that the theory
of valuation, in its reliance on prices observed in the markets, was also
subject to severe limitations—in that the role of public goods was increas-
ingly large, and the changing quality of goods not adequately reflected
in the market because proper judgment of quality became increasingly
difficult. This is not to deny the value of the conventional measures
(with the theories implicit in them) as useful, if crude, approximations.
One had to begin with those, as well-established in the conceptual struc-
ture of the discipline and as yielding articulated aggregates that would
be relatively easily obtainable, and use them to derive the first approxi-
mations. Without the use of the latter, we could hardly have been able to
learn as much as we did. But itis this learning that resulted in re-
emphasizing the various questions of improper inclusion and omission,
the large magnitudes of which were suggested in the course of applying
conventional measures to the quantitative analysis of economic growth.
It is clearly the long-term aspect of the latter, the use of a period long
enough for productivity residuals, structural changes, changes in condi-
tions of life, and the sources of the large advances in both positive output
and negative by-products to be observed; with the observations serving
to emphasize the gaps in the conventional measurement, gaps that would
not look as large in dealing with the more limited perspective of short-
term changes.
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The shift to the long-term viewpoint of economic growth suggests
other problematic aspects of the current measures of economic perform-
ance—aspects not covered in the papers and discussion here, and prob-
ably meriting a brief note. First, increased emphasis on investment in
human capital, on the household, and, in general, on the human factor in
economic growth—as distinct from material capital and impersonal-seem-
ing organizations and institutions—calls also for much greater attention
to the distributive aspects of economic performance than appears to have
been paid in the recent past. With rapid structural changes and depend-
ence of high levels of economic performance on continuous reconciliation
of conflicts incipient in the shifts of economic position of various social
and economic groups implicit in structural changes, the distributive ques-
tions—who gets how much of the growing product—emerge to key im-
portance. It is curious that properly formulated allocations of total prod-
uct among significantly distinct groups in the population are not an inte-
gral part of the dominant systems of national economic accounts. And
the aggregation that takes place automatically treats total product as an
undifferentiated mass in which the high product of the upper income
groups and the low product of the poor form one pool—the divisions of
which are by industrial origin, or type of factor return, or type of use, or
by region, but not by meaningful class and other economic groups within
the population. Yet the sharing of these groups in economic growth is an
important prerequisite of maintenance of economic productivity and high
level of economic performance. The increasing stress on the household,
and on the human factor, suggests that distributive allocations will have
to be integrated into the measurement of economic performance much
more closely than they have been so far.
The second aspect relates to international comparability. Many of the
issues raised in the papers and in the discussion would assume an even
clearer form, and perhaps different weights, if discussed in the context of
meaningful comparisons in the level, or changes in the level, of economic
performance among countries at different levels of economic develop-
ment, or characterized by different patterns of social and economic or-
ganization. Perhaps it was wise, in organizing the present conference, to
limit the discussion to measurement of economic performance in a single
country (or a group of countries similar in their level of development and
character of their social and political organization). As it was, the au-
thors and discussants had to grapple with a wide variety of far-reaching
and difficult problems. But it should be recognized that however the
issues are resolved for the case of a single country or a given group of
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countries at specified levels of development and with a given sociopoliti-
cal structure, they will have to be reexamined when the goal is set of
establishing comparability beyond the assumedly narrow range of differ-
entials in levels of development or in the conditioning sociopolitical struc-
ture. There is a clear parallel in the effects on the various issues raised
above between those of concern with the longer run of economic growth,
and those resulting from attempts at international comparison of eco-
nomic performance across a wide span of differences in levels of de-
velopment and in the character of the social structure of the countries.
3.THESHORT- AND THE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVES
Every measure of economic performance, particularly an aggregate for a
large entity like a country, reflects some basic assumptions and theories
—assumptions about the distinction between economic activity and life
in general, and about final goals of economic activity; and theories of
production (inputs and outputs, and the relations between them) and of
valuation (ways of combining inputs and outputs of different descrip-
tion). There are inevitably compromises in the extent to which the
agreed-upon underlying assumptions and theoretically grounded con-
cepts are faithfully and fully implemented in measurement—for the cost
of complete conformity may be extremely high and yet yield only trivial
adjustments as compared with a reasonable compromise. But the con-
cepts and theories may differ depending upon the orientation and analyti-
cal uses that the measures are intended to serve—and they are relevant
only to such uses. After all, we do not estimate, and use the national
product estimate, of a country in order to measure its attainment in pure
science, or in the arts, or in the increased supply of specimens of the
New Communist Man; nor even to gauge levels of happiness, or changes
therein, as reflected in responses of a representative sample of a coun-
try's population.
Clearly, the current set of measures of aggregative economic perform-
ance in the developed countries are better designed to reflect changes in
the short rather than the long period, and may have been meant largely
for that use. In the short run, structural changes and changes in condi-
tions of life may be assumed to be small; changes in technology and
pollution may be taken to be limited; and so would changes in quality of
labor and capital, in the quality of complex goods, in the relative mag-
nitude of public goods and in the duplication introduced by the inter-
mediate character of much government activity. This assumption of rela-
tive fixity in the "questionable" components in the economic accounts is,Concluding Remarks 589
of course, with reference to the magnitude of the possible short-term
changes in those inputs and outputs about which there is little question—
and it is particularly plausible when we are concerned with the kind of
fluctuation that is involved in business cycles. Furthermore, if we are
guided by the Keynesian notion of the possible insufficiency of final de-
mand as the major short-term problem, we may be justified in classifying
all household purchases and all purchases of goods by government as
final consumption, since they do represent demand not for resale in the
near future (with or without fabrication or processing); and demand for
business capital formation is classified as final because the resale through
use is extended into the much longer future. In short, in the concern with
short-term changes, particularly fluctuations, it is possible to set aside
many of the issues raised so sharply by the long-term perspective, and
derive measures that are tolerable, and agreed-upon, gauges of the short-
term movements in the economy and in its major component parts—of
the type provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce or embodied in
the international set of accounts of the United Nations.
The value of such acceptable measures of short-term changes and
fluctuations, for orientation and analysis of short-term policies, should
not be underestimated. So long as it is clearly understood that they are
not adequately meaningful measures of economic growth 1—not even of
the short-term path of the long-term trend—and so long as they are used
in full recognition that they are measures of total short-term change of
which growth is one, but still to be determined, component, no harm and
much gain can be derived. After all, a full record is provided of the out-
puts and inputs in many sectors of the economy; and the fact that there
are elements of duplication and omission, when the change is viewed as
1Asemantic confusion is introduced by the double connotation of the term
"growth" and the verb "grows": they may mean merely an increase (and itis
to be noted that a decline is rarely referred to as "decay" or "senescence" which
would be the proper opposite of growth); or they may mean movement along
the long-term secular path, which is the quantitative counterpart of a properly
defined growth process, connoting much more than mere increase. When a state-
ment is made in an economic report that the country grewina given year, it is,
literally taken, true only in the sense of an increase in some specific aggregative
total; and much more analysis and knowledge would be required to establish
that the country moved along the path of meaningful growth, involving back-
ward and forward implications. The demands posed by a true measure of growth
for resolution of the issues listed in the discussion lie in the reasonably assumed
importance of the costs and returns defined differently from the conventional
for both measuring and analyzing growth conceived as a movement along the
secular growth path. In our discussion of economic growth here, it is the second
of the two connotations of the term that is meant.•1
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part of a growth trend, may be seen only as a partial qualification, still
leaving the record useful as a gauge of current fluctuations, either in the
absolute totals or in the apparent rate of change. Furthermore, consider-
ing the variety of conceptual and measurement problems that would have
to be resolved before a fully adequate measure of growth is secured, and
considering how much more will have to be learned about varying pat-
terns of growth over time, one will have to wait long before reliable
measures of the ongoing process of growth over short periods can be
designed. Meanwhile, it may be useful to have crude measures of
short-term movements, even if they are only uncertain approximations to
current growth.
One should note that the remarkably rapid spread of the Department
of Commerce gross national product estimates in this country into wide
use in the recent two decades appears to have been accompanied by an
effort to make these measures more timely, i.e., available for increasingly
shorter intervals; to impound the major debatable and complex measure-
ment problems, because of the danger that they would make the esti-
mates less rather than more serviceable as acceptable gauges of short-
term changes; and to strive to preserve and improve the accuracy of the
estimates within the limits of the agreed-upon conventional concepts.
The bias of the measures toward their use as short-term indicators has
thus increased—and naturally so, since it is in this use that they found
their increasingly widespread application, by business firms, by govern-
ment, and for purposes of general orientation by the periodical press.
It would not be easy to argue that, given the limited resources (finan-
cial and intellectual), and the difficulty of establishing acceptable meas-
ures of economic growth that would take sufficient cognizance of still
largely unknown aspects of the issues raised above, the choices in the
development of national income accounting by the Department of Com-
merce over the last two decades were not optimal. This does not mean
that more could not have been done, within a narrower scope than that
suggested by the issues listed, to remove at least some of the limiting
conventions. For example, possibly more could have been done in moving
toward a replacement basis of fixed capital depreciation charges; or even
in an attempt at adjustment for price changes, at least for household
expenditures, that would reflect the changing weights of urban com-
munities with their different price levels. But it would be improper to
press even these points, without adequate knowledge of the constraints
and of the alternatives that had to be weighed.
Two reflections are suggested by the comments just made. The first,Concluding Remarks 591
already noted, is that the magnitude and difficulty of the measurement
problems raised in the papers and in the discussion in this conference
are great; and that an extensive program of experimental work, using the
present data, calling for further and different data, and then using the
latter, is required, before some of the components can be so defined that
approximations in quantitative terms would be derivable continuously in
sufficiently acceptable form to assure their usefulness in some set of na-
tional accounts—perhaps a set geared to measurement of growth, al-
though still linkable with, and translatable into, the short-term accounts.
While exploratory forays may be, and should be, made within the proxi-
mate future, it will take a number of years before the results of con-
tinuous research will cumulate into an acceptable new measurement
framework. Second, we cannot expect that such experimental work will
be carried through within the government. The decisions of government
with respect to economic measurement have to be based upon a suffi-
ciently agreed-upon framework to warrant expectation of wide accept-
ance, a sufficient consensus of confidence, so as to provide an adequate
basis for use in broad orientation and in policy decisions within the gov-
ernment. It remains to be seen whether the experimental and imaginative
work by economists and other social science analysts will succeed in
formulating the concepts and in devising acceptable measures of eco-
nomic growth that could serve as proper guides to the government in
its commitment, through various policy instruments, to assist and pro-
mote the desired economic growth as defined and measured.
The problems raised in the papers and discussion set the task largely
for experimental, scholarly research, and are not fitted for coverage by
the type of consensus reporting that is done so well under government
auspices, with the use of large resources and adequate coverage—once
the basic consensus on concepts and meaning is given. The work ex-
emplified by the Nordhaus-Tobin paper is clearly in this experimental
and imaginative category; and one looks forward with great expectations
to the results of work at the National Bureau by Kendrick, Eisner, and
the Ruggleses reported on in the 51st Annual Report, September 1971
(pp. 77—81). Such work has been rather limited so far, and perhaps it
is not surprising—given the emphasis on the major issue provided by
concern with, and learning about, economic growth. After all, the out-
burst of work on economic growth is a matter of the last twenty-five
years; and the time for the evaluation and absorption of the problems
raised by it, in the way of limitations of the traditional framework of
economic measurement, has been rather short.592 Concluding Remarks
It would not help to underestimate the difficulties of research which
these problems call for, and cast our discussion in terms that might sug-
gest that the conventional system of national product accounting could
be easily modified to accommodate the issues. Nor would it help to un-
derestimate the importance of systematic, exploratory, and continuous
work on the issues just raised by scholars outside the constraints of gov-
ernment, within academic and research institutions, for gradually build-
ing up a set of concepts and measures more appropriate for gauging
long-term changes in economic performance. No mere improvement in
the conventional accounts is likely to be sufficient to provide adequate
answers and solutions to the complex issues that the rapidly changing
structure and pattern of modern economic growth raise in approximating
meaningful measures of unduplicated net product for significant com-
ponents and groups. But the cumulative contribution of the continuous
and detailed conventional accounts do provide us with an invaluable
quarry, a base from which the radical revisions, substitutions, and supple-
mentation can start.